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Leggio v. Leggio

Leggio v. Leggio

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVALOF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS______________________________MARLENE LEGGIO,:SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY:CHANCERY DIVISION: PASSAIC COUNTYPlaintiff,:DOCKET NO.: FM-16-1229-04:v.::SALVATORE LEGGIO,:CIVIL ACTION:Defendant.: _____________________________OPINIONDecided: April 8, 2014APPROVED FOR PUBLICATIONMarlene Leggio, plaintiff pro se.JULY 21, 2014COMMITTEE ON OPINIONSBOTTINELLI, J.S.C.PROCEDURAL HISTORY & FACTUAL FINDINGSThis is a pro se motion for a name change filed by plaintiff on March 8, 2014. Noopposition was filed by the defendant. As part of plaintiff’s submission she had provided a copyof a dual judgment of divorce from bed and board, which was granted pursuant to N.J.S.A.2A:34-3. Plaintiff and defendant were married on July 11, 1958, and thereafter sought a divorcefrom bed and board. Both parties were represented by counsel.The dual judgment of divorce from bed and board was entered on July 15, 2004.A review of court records does not show any action taken by either party since entry ofthe judgment. There is no record of a revocation or suspension of the limited judgment ofdivorce nor of an absolute divorce being entered.It has been said that the closest analogy to a “legal separation” is a divorce from bed andboard. The New Jersey Family Law Practice series at section 2.6 notes that a limited divorce1 has, historically, been known “as a divorce a mensa et thoro, or simply a limited divorce. . . .

July 25, 2014 Read More
A-3062-13T2 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM E. NAZARIO(13-09-1631,MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

A-3062-13T2 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM E. NAZARIO(13-09-1631,MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

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RECORD IMPOUNDEDNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THEAPPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISIONSUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEYAPPELLATE DIVISIONDOCKET NO. A-3062-13T2STATE OF NEW JERSEY,Plaintiff-Respondent,v.WILLIAM E. NAZARIO,Defendant-Appellant.Argued June 17, 2014 ­ Decided July 25, 2014Before Judges Parrillo and Alvarez.On appeal from the Superior Court of NewJersey,LawDivision,Monmouth County,Indictment No. 13-09-1631.Robert Rogers argued the cause for appellant(Rogers & Krajewski, attorneys; Mr. Rogers,on the briefs).Monica do Outeiro, Special Deputy AttorneyGeneral/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, arguedthe cause for respondent (Christopher J.Gramiccioni,ActingMonmouthCountyProsecutor, attorney; Ms. do Outeiro, on thebrief).PER CURIAMDefendant William E. Nazario was indicted for fourth-degreeoperating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension,N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).The statute criminalizes the operation of”a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension . . . if the actor’s license was suspended or revoked for a second orsubsequent violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50. . . .”The statuteprovides that:”[a] person convicted of an offense under thissubsectionshallbesentencedbythecourttoatermofimprisonment.”Subsection (c) specifies the minimum that mustbe served:”[I]f a person is convicted of a crime under thissectionthesentenceimposedshallincludeafixedminimumsentence of not less than 180 days during which the defendantshall not be eligible for parole.”Because of the mandatoryjail term, defendant was denied admission to the Monmouth CountyDrug Court program.We granted leave to appeal and now affirm.The record does not include the circumstances surroundingthestopwhichresultedintheindictment,however,duringdefendant’s Drug Court interview, he said “that his driver’slicense ha[d] been suspended for at least one year due to histhird driving while intoxicated while currently on his secondsuspension for the same charge.”Defendant was evaluated asclinicallyeligibleforparticipationintheprogram,butstatutorily ineligible by the assistant county prosecutor whoreviewedhisapplication.N.J.S.A.2C:35-14b(3)statesthat”[a] person shall not be eligible for special probation pursuantto this section if the person is convicted of . . . .

July 25, 2014 Read More
A-1086-13T2 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JEFFREY AYERS(07-09-3331, ESSEXCOUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

A-1086-13T2 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JEFFREY AYERS(07-09-3331, ESSEXCOUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THEAPPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISIONSUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEYAPPELLATE DIVISIONDOCKET NO. A-1086-13T2STATE OF NEW JERSEY,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.JEFFREY AYERS,Defendant-Respondent._____________________________Argued February 25, 2014 ­ Decided July 25, 2014Before Judges Messano and Rothstadt.On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No.07-09-3331.Sara A. Friedman, Special Deputy AttorneyGeneral/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, arguedthe cause for appellant (Carolyn A. Murray,Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney;Ms. Friedman, on the brief).William P. Welaj, Designated Counsel, arguedthe cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Welaj, on thebrief).PER CURIAMThe State appeals from an order granting defendant JeffreyAyers post-conviction relief (PCR) on the basis that his defensecounsel rendered ineffective assistance when she failed toapprise defendant of the consequences of waiving his right to testify at trial.Defendant was convicted of charges thatincluded murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy tocommit robbery, following a jury trial presided over by JudgeGarry J. Furnari.He subsequently filed a PCR petition.Adifferent judge held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s PCRpetition, and concluded that counsel’s failure to properlyadvise defendant amounted to constitutionally deficientrepresentation, entitling defendant to a new trial.The PCRcourt granted the State’s application for a stay and this appealfollowed.On appeal, the State argues that the PCR court “erred inpresuming ineffectiveness [of counsel and in] presumingprejudice.”Defendant disagrees and argues that the trialrecord and the PCR hearing record supported the PCR court’sdecision.We have considered these arguments after a carefulreview of the record, and conclude that we agree with the PCRcourt’s decision that counsel failed to adequately advisedefendant of the consequences of waiving his right to testify attrial; but we find no evidence, under the second prong of theStrickland/Fritz1 test, that the deficiency prejudiceddefendant’s right to a fair trial.Accordingly,we reverse the1Strickland v. . . .

July 25, 2014 Read More